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Michael Bossetta
THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA: 
SPEAR PHISHING AND CYBERATTACKS ON 
DEMOCRACY
Abstract: State-sponsored cyber groups have long utilized spear phishing to 
pierce government networks. Spear phishing relies on social engineering to 
trick individuals into revealing sensitive information or downloading mali-
cious software, rather than hacking into a system vulnerability by force. While 
email remains the preferred medium to conduct spear-phishing attacks, social 
media has opened up new attack vectors for politically motivated cyberattacks. 
Social media platforms, as high-trust environments typically accessed from a 
mobile device for personal entertainment or networking, are highly conducive 
waters for spear phishing. Moreover, the wealth of public information available 
on social media can be exploited by threat actors to devise sophisticated (and 
automated) spear phishing campaigns that target government and military 
personnel. This study examines how illiberal regimes are weaponizing social 
media to conduct spear phishing and cyber espionage against Western govern-
ments. A theoretical model of spear phishing on social media is proposed and 
supported by recent empirical examples from the European Union and United 
States. 
Much of the controversy around Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elec-tion has focused on state-sponsored attempts to manipulate public opinion 
through social media. However, just weeks after President Donald J. Trump’s 
inauguration, Russian operatives demonstrated a cyber capability far exceeding 
the paid use of “trolls” to spread propaganda. More than 10,000 tweets—each 
laced with hyperlinks containing malware—were sent directly to U.S. Defense 
Department employees on Twitter.1 The messages were tailored to appeal to the 
employees’ individual interests and generated click rates nearing 70 percent. In 
some cases, employees’ family members were targeted, and devices containing 
sensitive government information were compromised through shared home Wi-Fi 
networks. ZeroFOX, a leading cybersecurity firm, referred to the malicious micro-
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targeting campaign as “the most well organized, coordinated attack at the nation-
state level we’ve ever seen…it’s a harbinger of things to come.”2
Increasingly, foreign actors are turning to social media to carry out cyberat-
tacks. With an estimated 3.2 billion people active on social media, state-affiliated 
threat groups have access to massive troves of personal data that can inform 
sophisticated spear phishing campaigns.3 Moreover, social media platforms open 
up new attack vectors, and advances in technology displace the notion that social 
media is difficult to weaponize for country-specific policy goals.4 This paper out-
lines how illiberal regimes are weaponizing social media to carry out cyberattacks 
against Western governments and their personnel. A theoretical model of social 
media spear phishing is proposed and supported empirically with recent examples 
from Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States.
Spear Phishing, Cyber Espionage, and Social Media
Spear phishing is a targeted phishing attack customized to an individual or 
set of individuals. Phishing attacks bait victims to take an action, which typically 
involves clicking a malicious link or opening an email attachment that harbors a 
malware payload.5 Both actions can lead victims to fabricated websites that ask for 
login credentials (“credential spear phishing”)6 or download software directly to 
the victim’s device (“drive-by downloads”).7 Attackers then leverage the credentials 
or infected devices to gain access to a broader network, stealing information and 
often remaining undetected for extended periods of time.
Cyberespionage by state-affiliated actors accounts for 25 percent of successful 
phishing breaches.8 The primary motivation is to extract sensitive government 
data, which can be appropriated for several pernicious purposes. As shown by the 
Russian-backed spear phishing attacks on the email accounts of Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign manager, John Podesta, and former U.S. Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell,9 the data can be publicly released for defamation (“doxxing”) or electoral 
influence. The theft of intellectual property, such as military plans or technology 
innovations, can be utilized to advance strategic geopolitical objectives. Moreover, 
the procurement of trade or manufacturing information can provide a tactical 
advantage in trade negotiations.
Although email remains the preferred attack vector for spear phishing, spear 
phishing attacks on social media increased 500 percent in 2016.10 The attacks 
peaked around major events like the Olympics and the U.S. election, as threat 
actors aimed to exploit public interest in trending online conversations. As with 
email, the majority of social media phishing attacks are financially motivated 
cybercrimes. However, government agencies are becoming increasingly aware of 
the political and military risks associated with social media weaponization.11 In 
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the following sections, I develop a theoretical model of spear phishing on social 
media to highlight how illiberal regimes are weaponizing social media platforms to 
attack Western democracies.
A Model of Spear Phishing on Social Media
The model consists of five phases: Collect, Construct, Contact, Compromise, 
and Contagion. The first phase of a spear phishing attack is to collect data on 
the intended target. Social media platforms offer a wealth of publicly available 
data, and these data can be exploited to then construct fake accounts that appeal 
to the target’s personal or professional interests. Using these accounts, attackers 
contact targets through any variety of communicative modes enabled by the plat-
form, ranging from friend requests to direct messages to targeted advertisement 
campaigns. Depending on the attacker’s intentions, the target may be tricked into 
revealing information or clicking a link that compromises the target’s account or 
device. If successful, the attack can then induce a contagion effect, magnifying its 
scope and putting others at risk. Below, I outline each of these phases in detail.
Figure 1: Model of Spear Phishing on Social Media
Collect
To increase the likelihood of success for a spear phishing attack, threat actors 
first collect data to inform their operations.12 This data collection can be divided 
into two sub-categories: discovery and reconnaissance. Discovery entails the use 
of social media data to identify targetable persons. Threat actors may know the 
agency they wish to breach, but they may not have a precise list of individuals to 
target. Simply by using a platform’s search function, specific keywords relating 
to an organization or policy area can be queried to discover individuals who may 
possess knowledge or credentials deemed valuable. In 2015, the British secu-
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rity agency, MI5, warned employees that Chinese and Russian spies were using 
LinkedIn, the professional networking platform, to identify government employees 
to recruit for espionage operations.13 
Once identified, reconnaissance can be carried out on the target. In addition to 
identifying one’s online connections, threat actors can collect personally identifi-
able information such as email addresses, phone numbers, work history, education, 
or interests. The attacker can also observe the target’s previous online interac-
tions, particularly on open platforms such as Twitter and LinkedIn. Ahead of the 
2017 French election, Facebook identified approximately two dozen fake accounts 
spying on then-candidate Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign. These 
accounts, linked to the Russian hacking group Fancy Bear—the same organization 
responsible for the email hacks of the U.S. Democratic National Committee—were 
“posing as friends of friends of Macron associates and trying to glean informa-
tion from them.”14 Although Facebook detected the operation early and blocked 
the accounts, the apparent intent of the campaign was to gather intelligence for 
a spear-phishing attack, “…to get targets to download malicious software or give 
away login information.”15
The purpose of data collection is to identify and observe targets to design a 
customized attack, thereby increasing its chances for success. This data collection 
process has both manual and automated variants. The former is time intensive 
and likely reserved for high-profile targets (i.e. “whaling”), but data can also be 
automatically collected at scale through platforms’ Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) or commercial third-party software such as Grouply, which har-
vests personal information from public Facebook groups.16 Additionally, programs 
can be written in open-source programming software, like Python or R, to compile 
employee lists from agencies’ LinkedIn accounts or web pages.17,18 From there, 
employees’ personal information can be harvested automatically across several dif-
ferent social media accounts.
Construct
Once threat actors collect data, they construct fake social media profiles to 
interact with the target. The design of these profiles is informed by the data col-
lection and seeks to establish common ground. The constructed persona may 
include fabricated credentials, such as working in the same organization or having 
attended the same university. Constructed accounts may even mimic or fabricate 
organizations, as demonstrated by the Russian Internet Research Agency’s creation 
of Facebook pages such as “United Muslims of America” and “Blacktivist.”19
Given that defense contractors, military service members, and IT-personnel 
typically skew male, constructed accounts are often portrayed as attractive females, 
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whose photos are stolen from authentic profiles (“Catphishing”). This method 
formed the basis of the Robin Sage Experiment, where a cybersecurity firm lever-
aged the constructed profile of a “young, attractive, and edgy female” to establish 
LinkedIn connections with senior executives at the U.S. National Security Agency, 
Department of Defense, and military intelligence groups.20 Iranian hackers, tar-
geting Middle Eastern industries and governments, put the Robin Sage experiment 
into practice by creating the fictitious “Mia Ash.”21 To bolster the persona’s authen-
ticity, the group repurposed the photos of a female Romanian photographer and 
established accounts on LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
Recently, the German domestic intelligence service Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz (BfV) released screenshots of fake LinkedIn accounts con-
structed by Chinese intelligence services.22 
The examples illustrate the accounts’ clear orientation toward Western users 
working with issues related to Chinese foreign policy.
Figure 2: Constructed LinkedIn Profiles (Source: BfV)
Perhaps even more crucial than credentials and photos for a constructed account 
are profile metrics: the platform-specific, quantitative indicators that users rely on 
to make judgements about a profile. Chief among these indicators is the number 
of connections associated with an account; these “friend cues” signal endorsements 
of authenticity from other users on the platform. State-sponsored actors recognize 
the importance of profile metrics, and they have developed innovative methods 
to artificially inflate them.23 On LinkedIn, for example, an Iranian group utilizes 
networks of “Leader” and “Support” accounts.24 The purpose of Support accounts 
is to connect with, and leave public endorsements for, the Leader accounts (who 
maintain more than 500 connections, which is the maximum number publicly 
displayed on LinkedIn’s interface). Leader accounts may alter their front-facing 
identities by changing their names and photos periodically, but they still retain 
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their existing connections and networks. Another example of profile metrics is the 
account creation date, which is featured prominently on Twitter. Older accounts 
are more likely to be considered authentic, and therefore fabricated accounts, par-
ticularly those of bots, can lie dormant for years—“aging”—before being activated 
for malicious purposes.25
Contact
With data-driven, constructed accounts created, threat actors seek to initiate 
contact with their targets. This can be done in several ways contingent upon the 
platform’s “digital architecture,” defined as “the technical protocols that enable, 
constrain, and shape user behavior in a virtual space.”26 One common method is 
to connect with the target’s account: “friending” on Facebook, “connecting” on 
LinkedIn, or “following” on Twitter and Instagram. Pending the default privacy 
settings of the platform and the users’ customization of them, an accepted request 
can reveal non-public data on the target. Another contact method is the platform’s 
specific chat services, such as Facebook Messenger, LinkedIn InMail, or Twitter 
Direct Message. Through these chat services, threat actors can request informa-
tion or send malicious links in an environment where targets are accustomed to 
engaging in discussions with close friends.
A third, higher-risk contact method is advertisement campaigns, where threat 
actors can pay platforms to target certain demographics of users, such as those in 
a geographic location, holding a particular position, or working for a designated 
organization. Although social media companies hire human moderators to manu-
ally approve paid advertisements, there are documented instances of malware links 
bypassing this vetting process.27 With advances in technology and the sophisti-
cation of threat groups, however, malicious content can even be microtargeted 
without the use of advertisement services. As alluded to in the introduction, 
Russian operatives utilized Twitter to target U.S. Defense Department employees 
with individualized messages containing malicious links. 
A recent project by ZeroFOX researchers sheds insight into how such an attack 
could be conducted.28 First, a list of Twitter accounts is seeded into a program, 
which then automatically collects recently issued tweets from each account. 
Then, machine learning algorithms generate custom tailored messages—based on 
the content of the harvested tweets—and send them directly to the target. The 
message includes a malicious link shortened with Google’s popular URL short-
ener, which disguises the link’s destination, increases trustworthiness through a 
well-known brand, and allows the sender to monitor if the link has been clicked. 
The malicious tweets can then be sent at scheduled, strategic time points when 
the target is predetermined to be most active on Twitter. This process can be 
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entirely automated and was able to generate click through rates (CTR) as high 
as 66 percent, meaning that two-thirds of the generated links were clicked. The 
Russian attack, likely using a similar method, targeted more than 10,000 Defense 
Department employees and yielded 7,000 clicks for a CTR of approximately 70 
percent.29 To put that in perspective, the median CTR for phishing emails typically 
ranges between 6-13 percent, depending on the industry.30
Compromise
Compromise refers to the outcome of a successful spear phishing attack. 95 
percent of phishing breaches install software on the target’s device, and this is 
typically achieved when a user downloads an email attachment that contains 
a malware payload.31 On social media, where file attachments are uncommon, 
attackers aim to redirect users to a URL that installs malware on the device when 
accessed. Once the malware is installed, threat actors use the compromised device 
as a beachhead, crawling through a network and stealing information. Often, the 
target is unaware that their device has been affected, and attackers can remain 
undetected in a network for years.32
However, some threat actors prefer to pivot off the attack quickly by hijacking 
the social media account. The ISIS-affiliated “CyberCaliphate,” for example, 
hacked U.S. Central Command’s Twitter and YouTube accounts in 2015, using 
the accounts to briefly spew propaganda.33 More sophisticated attacks, such as the 
Russian one outlined above, can potentially compromise thousands of accounts 
at once, simultaneously reporting disinformation that could disrupt the news 
cycle or wreak havoc on the stock market. Other motivations for compromising 
social media accounts can be to steal private messages for blackmail or doxxing. 
Moreover, state-sponsored actors can generate messages from these accounts to 
stage evidence against individuals. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) has targeted the Facebook accounts of dissidents and journalists, shortly 
before arresting them for espionage. The IRGC sent messages from these accounts 
to other targets, presumably to entrap them by using the interactions as court evi-
dence for participation in an American-affiliated spy ring.34
Contagion
The malicious use of compromised accounts can lead to viral contagion 
and magnify the scope of an attack.35 Threat actors can launch attacks directly 
from compromised accounts, targeting the victim’s connections through private 
messages. Turkish threat actors employed this technique by first compromising 
the Twitter account of the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, then the 
president of the World Economic Forum, and eventually several high-profile U.S. 
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journalists.36 Private messages between Fox News journalists and President Trump 
were among the stolen data. This means that, in theory, the President of the 
United States’ Twitter account was susceptible to compromise. 
Contagion is especially dangerous because threat actors can target vulner-
able victims and scale up to bigger targets. The Iranian hacking of the U.S. State 
Department in 2015, for example, used the compromised Facebook accounts of 
young government employees to infect others higher up in the administration.37 
Furthermore, contagion can be facilitated by algorithmic recommender systems 
that promote compromised accounts to others.38 Finally, it is worth noting that 
contagion poses a particularly acute threat as technology moves toward the 
Internet of Things, where networks are increasingly interconnected and do not 
require user action to connect with one another.
Conclusion
Many cybersecurity reports do not explicitly discuss social media as an attack 
vector to breach government networks. Therefore, a lack of understanding remains 
regarding the role of social media platforms in politically motivated cyberattacks. 
This paper has shed light on how state-affiliated threat actors weaponize social 
media platforms to execute spear phishing campaigns. Using sophisticated social 
engineering tactics, maliciously aligned actors seek to manipulate individuals 
through seemingly innocuous interactions on social media. Democracy is under 
attack when its fundamental tenant—trust—is exploited for such illiberal pur-
suits.
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